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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DAVID J. SMITH, FOR THE ESTATE
OF SALLIE L. SMITH, LORETTA E.,
SMITH, FIDDLERS CANYON
DEVELOPMENT, LTD., AND
TRADERS INTERNATIONAL
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Appeal No. 20070501

CEDAR CITY MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION
Defendant/Appellant.

:

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
L SMITH HAS PRESERVED ALL ISSUES FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL
In its Brief ofAppellee, Cedar City ("the City") erroneously claims that Smith has
not adequately preserved the issues on appeal for this Court's review. Briefof Appellee p. 2.
Smith has preserved all issues from which he now appeals, as evidenced by Brief of
Appellant, the record provided to this Court for review of the issues, and further evidenced as
detailed herein.
UT. R. APP. P. 24 (a)(5)(A)-(B) provides that opening briefs in support of issues on
appeal must include "citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial
court; or a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial

court." The Utah Supreme Court has said that, when reviewing whether trial courts have had
the opportunity to rule on issues that are subsequently appealed, the reviewing court should
ascertain three factors, which are "(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the
issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or
relevant legal authority." Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, If 14,
48 P.3d 968, citing Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). In
Badger, the Utah Supreme Court held that, "once trial counsel has raised an issue before the
trial court, and the trial court has considered the issue, the issue is preserved for appeal." Id.
The Utah Court of Appeals has said, "[w]e therefore hold that, when an issue is
argued before the [trial] court and the court makes a definitive ruling, as is the case here, the
issue is adequately preserved for appeal." Salt Lake City v. Holtman, 806 P.2d 235, 237
(Utah App. 1991) (alteration added). The Utah Supreme Court has also indicated that, "[w]e
have often stated that 'issues not raised at trial cannot be argued for the first time on appeal'
.... unless the petitioner demonstrates that 'plain error' occurred or 'exceptional
circumstances1 exist." State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1 ^f 41, 63 P.3d 731, citing Monson v.
Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996) {quoting State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113
(Utah 1994)).
In the instant case, Smith appeals from an order of the trial court dismissing the action.
In his opening brief, Smith presents the following issues to this Court for review: the failure
of the trial court to convert the City's Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for Summary
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Judgment pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; the violation of Smith's due process
rights due to the trial court's failure to consolidate the instant case with a previous case in
issuing its Dismissal Order; and the reliance of the trial court upon an affidavit that swore to
the existence of a contract that was never admitted to the trial court as evidence. Brief of
Appellant pp. 1 -3. The Brief of Appellee claims that Smith has not preserved these issues with
the trial court for this Court's review. Brief of Appellee at pp. 2, 12-13. The following is a
citation to the record, evidencing the preservation of these issues for this Court's review.
Smith's first issue on appeal is a claim that the trial court erred when it failed to
convert the City's Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for Summary Judgment. This issue is
argued more particularly below, however, the following shows the preservation of this issue
on appeal. The trial court issued an order titled Stipulated Order Vacating Trial; Dismissing
Plaintiff's Second and Third Causes of Action with Prejudice and on the Merits; Setting a
Briefing Schedule RE: to Plaintiff's First Cause of Action; and Preserving Factual for Future
Hearing. Ibid., pp. 1-3. In this order, the trial court set a briefing schedule, directing the
parties to prepare a memorandum of law with points and authorities and argument for the
trial court's determination of Smith's entitlement to a setoff as a matter of law. Id. at p. 2.
Smith timely filed the Trial Brief as directed by the trial court's order, which requested
an evidentiary hearing. Trial Brief at p. 3. Smith further alleged in the Trial Brief that the
City had taken and or damaged private property which entitled Smith to just compensation
under Utah law; that the SID was invalid since it was constructed upon private property; and
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that the flood control structure resulted in taxes being levied against Smith. Id. at pp. 3-9.
The City responded in a motion titled Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's "Trial Brief and
Motion to Dismiss, alleging that Smith had failed to state a claim for which relief could be
granted. Ibid, at p. 1. The City's response disputed Smith's claims arguing, among other
things, that Smith was barred from relief due to claim and issue preclusion and that the SID
was valid. Id. at pp. 5-14. Smith responded to the City's response by filing Reply to
Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's "Trial Brief' and Motion to Dismiss which included an
amended statement of facts. Ibid, at p. 2. Smith argued in the reply that he was entitled to just
compensation before the condemnation proceedings commenced, that issue and claim
preclusion did not apply to the instant matter, and again argued that the SID was invalid due
to its construction upon private property. Id. at pp. 3-15.
The City then filed a Motion to Strike certain portions of Smith's amended statement
of facts, alleging that the facts were unsupported by affidavit, discovery material, or
documentation. Ibid, at p. 1. Smith responded by filing Response in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Strike which included the affidavit of Frank Nichols. Ibid. Attachment
~A~. The City filed Reply to Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Strike, which included an affidavit and part of a deposition as exhibits. Ibid. Exhibit #1 and
Exhibit #2. The City relied upon its exhibits to demonstrate that it had not taken private
property and was not required to provide Smith with just compensation. Id. at p. 1.

4

The trial court granted the City's Motion to Dismiss in its Order (in jtum^ Lh ienda*" 's
'1 lotU m J"( > Dismi s. s ("Dismissal Orde*

tate a claim for

which relief could be granted. Ibid, at p. 3. However, the trial court granted the City's Motion
to Dismiss as one for summary judgment as it relied upon documents outside the pleadings in
ml ill iiiiisscu hi .in [i

mini loui \ (i ,1', aijjtH il III Siiiilli 1t |M*mn • mu I (fin (n<ii \ \ \\\t lulu >l

properly convert the City's Motion to Dismiss to one for summary judgment, but onl)
determined in its decision that it would grant it as one for summary judgment. Id. at p

7

When oral argument - ; e itiank 1H:IUH illir IIII.II MHHC1 I )Miins^iil I irdcr, Snnlh M;JSUIM <•
that the trial court would treat the City's Motion to Dismiss as one for summary judgment and
therefore did not present further evidence at that time to support the pleadings for relief.
Therefore, Smith properly pres«

i

As lor Smith's sa nnif issue loi i'v\ lew on appeal, the Dismissal Order relied upon the
outcome of a previous action, that led to the filing of the instant matter, in its determination
that this issue had previously been resolved in another order, hI Smith moved to conS olidate
111* ruses us i \ idem \ ill li'i Ihe OMIMII.II ;H lion w hit h was denied by the trial court. Therefore,
Smith is within his bounds to request review on this issue by this Court.
Smith's third issue on appeal is preserved due to the record being vacant of any
contract in suppo
said affidavit in its Dismissal Order and, at the same time, admonishing Smith for failing to
provide any evidence outside the pleadings to support his allegations. Id. at pp. 2-4 The
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Dismissal Order is the order from which Smith now appeals. Smith has taken his issues for
review directly from the Dismissal Order which appropriately requires this Court's review.
Furthermore, Smith's opening brief includes sufficient "citation to the record showing that
the issue[s] w[ere] preserved in the trial court." UT. R. APP. P. 24 (a)(5)(A). However, this
Court should ascertain whether the issues have been "raised in a timely fashion," that the
issues were "specifically raised," and that Smith has "introduced supporting evidence or
relevant legal authority." Brookside at 11 14. Smith specifically raised the issues which he
now appeals in a timely fashion in his Trial Brief and subsequent replies to the trial court.
The trial court rejected those issues, which now places those issues before this Court.
Therefore, under Badger, the trial court considered the issues in its Dismissal Order, which
preserved the issues for appeal and this Court's review. Id The trial court's Dismissal Order
is a definitive order from which Smith now appeals. Salt Lake City at 237. Smith is not
barred from asserting his issues on appeal because he has preserved the issues with the trial
court. Id. Hence, the City's contention that Smith has not properly preserved the issues
should be rejected by this Court.
A.

The Complaint Sufficiently Alleged Smith's Claim against the City and
Did Not Require a Showing of Compliance with the Statutes Governing
Special Improvement Districts.

This Court has previously stated that, "[a] complaint must contain a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Busche v. Salt Lake
County, 2001 UT App. 111, H6,26 P.3d 862, citingUT. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (quotations omitted).
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A complaint can be dismissed if it fails to set forth the plain statement showing entillei niwil (o
•r|iH kfsa! on (In1' fiulinv In sfad ;i rl.imi I'M w hirh idiri in n In," pranfai Y
, „ r I •r.R.CJV.P.
12(b)(6). However, this Court went on to state in Busche, that "[t]he claim need not be
specific, rather, under Utah's liberal notice pleading requirements, all that is required is that
linn iili'juliiijis be Miifkit ill I i I>M f* fiimr imtn \ nl llir iiiilmv iiiini Insi nl llir i hum issrrtedand
a general indication of the type of litigation involved." Busche at U6 citing Fishbaugh v.
Utah Power & Light 969 P.2d 403, 406 (Utah 1998) (quotations omitted).
Il IK I lliih Siiiifiii iiiiiiii I luiiiil lllhi i fin ii(nir,!\ i\\u\\\ t d lln IIIIIII vn\ niiiiiLi plcmliii|.»s in
civil actions and stated as follows:
Thus our interpretation of the pleading rules must turn upon the fact that
"[w]hat [the parties] are entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an
opportunity to meet them. When this is accomplished, that is all that is
required." Id.; see also Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 667 (Utah
1985); F.M.A. Fin. Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670, 672
(1965). In Williams v. State Farm Insurance Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah
1982), we reaffirmed our holding in Cheney, stating that the rules " 'allow
examination into and settlement of all issues bearing upon the controversy,'
with latitude for proof that extends beyond the pleadings, where appropriate."
(Citing Cheney, 14 Utah 2d at 211,3 81 P.2d at 91.) These holdings reflect the
philosophy of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 53(c), which states that "every
final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is
rendered is entitled, even if the party has nol demanded such relief in his
pleadings."
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, Hi i I1 Jd I mo I I \ I H.ili !l»%).
In i"n,'inviii!» .u linns III.TI1 im dismissal (m IMIIHIP In shile a claim for which relief
may be granted, the Utah Supreme Court has also said as follows:
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In reviewing the dismissal, we must keep in mind that the purpose of a rule
12(b)(6) motion is to challenge the formal sufficiency of the claim for relief,
not to establish the facts or resolve the merits of a case. 5A Charles A. Wright
& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990). We also
note that a dismissal is justified only when the allegations of the complaint
clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff does not have a claim. See UTAH R. Civ.
P. 8(a) (stating that the only requirements of a complaint are that it contain a
"short and plain statement... showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' and
"a demand for judgment for the relief.")
Whipple v. American Fork Irr. Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996). While some actions
require particularized and specific allegations contained within the complaint, such as fraud,
the instant case did not require such particularized and specific allegations. See, UT. R. CIV.
P. 9(b). Aside from actions that involve fraud or defamation, the Utah Supreme Court has
said as follows:
It is evident from these statements that the fundamental purpose of our
liberalized pleading rules is to afford parties "the privilege of presenting
whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute," Cheney
v. Rucker, supra, subject only to the requirement that their adversary have "fair
notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication
of the type of litigation involved." Blackham v. Snelgrove, supra. The
functions of issue-formulation and fact-revelation are appropriately left to the
deposition-discovery process. The rules "allow examination into and
settlement of all issues bearing upon the controversy," Cheney v. Rucker,
supra, with latitude for proof that extends beyond the pleadings, where
appropriate. Rule 15(b). It also appears from the cited decisions that these
principles are applied with great liberality in sustaining the sufficiency of
allegations stating a cause of action or an affirmative defense.
Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co.. 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982) citing Blackham v.
Snelgrove. 3 Utah 2d 157.160.280 P.2d 453.455 (1955) and Cheney v. Rucker. 14 Utah 2d
205,211,381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963).

8

In the instant case, Smith filed the Complaint which contained the allegations that the
('" i (y had not provided just compensatJ
order to construct the SID. See, Complaint

> •.

n

Smith sufficiently pled compliance with the SID

statutes but was unable to further evidence such actions due to the trial court's Dismissal
Order. Furthermore, Smith was unaware that the trial c • : « it It w as treating the (" 11 \' i • I I <»11 < 1111 o
Dismiss as one foi summary judgment ' I In is, Smith did not present further evidence at oral
arguments to support the Complaint because he was not anticipating a showing on the merits,
but that he need only demonstrate a claim that would require relief as a mattei of la \ *
M ni 11 i 1111 \ > 111 • , i, • < 111111 h I < 111 r s o I V i \ ni 11 * mi i >< v< 11 i r e b e c a i lse Complaint contains statements
of Smith's claims showing he is entitled to relief. See, Busche, supra. While Smith's action
was dismissed on the basis that he failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted,
Hft/tmii H.ilii iHifh t'iu"', l.ii!" iioticY Iothe
City as to the nature and basis of Smith's claims and generally indicated the type of litigation
involved. Id Furthermore, the City was entitled to notice of Smith s issues ai id an

allowed an opportunity to prove his entitlement to relief because of the trial court's Dismissal
Order.
Smith's allegations contained in his Complaint demonstrate claims tl lat * c n ilcl < : • ititle
I i illr

In I Si«t Whipple, sttpm

As sialnt :ili»o\t/\ Smith demonstrated allegations within

the Complaint that would warrant relief, had he been given a chance to provide the trial court
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with evidence in support of his claims. Furthermore, Smith was entitled to "notice of the
issues raised and an opportunity to meet them." Jones at 1373. Smith was not given notice as
to the trial court's intention to treat the City's Motion to Dismiss as one for summary
judgment as evidenced by Smith only providing the trial court with the sufficiency of his
claim not evidence to establish facts that would resolve the merits of the case. Whipple at
1220. Smith provided the trial court with evidence that would require his action to survive a
motion to dismiss but not one for summary judgment. Furthermore, the Dismissal Order was
not justified because Smith's Complaint sufficiently detailed the allegations against the City
and compliance with SID statutes. Id. Smith's Complaint sets forth legitimate contention,
gives notice to the City concerning the claims, and indicates the type of litigation involved.
Williams at 971. Therefore, the City's contention in Brief of Appellee that Smith's Complaint
should show compliance with the SID statutes should be rejected since the Smith was not
required to do so in preparing and filing the Complaint but did so nonetheless.
B. Summary Judgment is Harmful in its Effect on Smith.
In discussing error that would warrant reversal of a trial court's decision, the Utah
Supreme Court has said, "[the error] must have been prejudicial. If the error was harmless,
that is, if the error was sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that
it affected the outcome of the case, then a reversal is not in order." Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d
1251, 1255 (Utah 1997) citing State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1227 (Utah 1997)
(alteration added). The Utah Supreme Court has said, "we will look to see whether the error,
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if any, should have been obvious and whether it was cured proeediii1,»11 \ ,IT id I havh\ » < < »I1I.,I «, 1
harness

Armed i-erees ins. bxchange v. Harrison, 2003 UI 14,11 22, 70 P.3d 35 citing

State v.Germonto. 868 P.2d 50, 58 (Utah 1993).
The Utah Supreme Court has also held the following concerning (lit grant 1 up ul
summary judgmen

>:

Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary
judgment is proper only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bangerter v.
Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983). It should be granted only when it clearly
appears that there is no reasonable probability that the party moved against
could prevail. Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715 (Utah 1982). As
this Court explained the standard:
Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, depositions,
affidavits and admissions show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. If there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning
questions of fact, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the
opposing party. Thus, the court must evaluate all the evidence
and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in a
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.
Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). See
also Lockhart Co v. Equitable Realty Inc., 657 P,2d 1333 (Utah
1983).
Frisbee v.K & K Const. Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984). The Utah Supreme Court has
further elaborated on the subject of summary judgments, stating, "[t]he purpose of summary
judgment is to eliminate the time, trouble, and expense of 1 1.1I \\ 1 \\ I is < li'm .is a matter of
l.iv Hi,i( llii (iiiil

1I1 ii .it'iiiiisl 11 ml entitled to prevail." Amiacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design

Associates. 635 P.2d 53 (Utah 1981).
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While the Utah Supreme Court has held that the grant of a summary judgment by a
trial court is not a harsh rule, "[s]uch showing must preclude all reasonable possibility that
the loser could, if given a trial, produce evidence which would reasonably sustain a judgment
in his favor." Burningham v. Ott 525 P.2d 620, 621 (Utah 1974). However, the Court in
Burningham did hold that "the evidence upon which one relies for judgment can be, and
should be, known to the opponent; and when all the evidence is known, if there is no dispute
on any material issue of fact, the rules provide that the court may apply the law and thus
terminate the matter." Id. at 621-22.
An earlier Utah Supreme Court case discusses the impact of summary judgment,
stating, "[pjrior decisions point out that summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should be
granted with reluctance. The plaintiffs should be granted the opportunity of producing
whatever evidence they wish, including circumstantial evidence, in support of their
contention." Houslev v. Anaconda Co., 19 Utah 2d 124,427 P.2d 390,392-393 (Utah 1967)
citing Welchman v. Wood, 9 Utah 2d 25,337 P.2d 410. The Utah Supreme Court has further
stated that a summary judgment is a "drastic remedy and the courts should be reluctant to
deprive litigants of an opportunity to fully present their contentions upon a trial. It should be
granted only when under the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff he could
not recover as a matter of law." Welchman v. Wood, 9 Utah 2d 25,337 P.2d 410,411-412
(Utah 1959).
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In the instant case, it is clear from the record that Smith u a s preparing .1 ilHinsr
against tl le City fs M< nionU 1 Dismis s,i lotfoi a motion for summary judgment. &^rr/a/J?r/e/I
Smith's Trial Brief relied upon applicable law and the Complaint in this matter. While the
City did provide affidavits and other documents for the Court's consideration, nowhere is it
stipulated in the record that

ourt would

consider the City's Motion to Dismiss as one for summary judgment. Furthermore, the record
demonstrates as cited supra that Smith was unaware that the trial court intended to treat the
1 \tyls Motion to Dismiss as one f01 si 11 1: 111: 1:13:1:3/ f1 ldgment I J ndei I Jtal 1 lavs , Smith should have
In i j 1 afforded the opportunity to provide the trial court with outside evidence to support his
claims. The only material Smith was able to provide to the trial court was an affidavit from
Frank Nichols because he did not know I it IVHIM in a i lopi 1101 JII< uilin ' iikidecnidciiee.
1

trial court states that Smith had not supported his Complaint with

outside evidence and erroneously relies on the City's affidavit from Kit Wareham. Since
summary judgments cannot be granted when there aic dispiiii/d MMM.TIUI I«I« (V llu- liml < ourt
< 1 irnl |v, piiintiiiji; ilk (*\\\" 1 1 UHI\ HI io Dismiss as one for summary judgment.
In the instant case, the failure of the trial court to convert the City's Motion to Dismiss
into one for summary judgment warrants reversal ol llir irml r r url's df* IM^II dm; in Hie
prejudh ii.il 11,1 InI( • ,i* ( I »| 1 lit s ( « Nimlli Pniv .tl I ''^ The error was not inconsequential in
that it barred Smith from going forward to prove entitlement for just compensation for the
property taken by the City. Id. This error should have been obvious to the trial court. Anned
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Forces at 22. The Dismissal Order dismissed the action against the City and terminated
Smith's right to proceed with his action, when he was entitled to relief based upon the
pleadings. Therefore, the error was not harmless. Id.
However, should this Court find that the trial court did not err in granting the City's
Motion to Dismiss as one for summary judgment, the standard for summary judgment was
not met. Summary judgments can only be granted when it "clearly appears that there is no
reasonable probability that the party moved against could prevail." Frisbee at 389. As set
forth supra, there were clearly disputed facts between the parties as evidenced by the
affidavits set forth and presented to the trial court. See, Affidavit of Kit Wareham and
Affidavit of Frank Nichols. While Kit Wareham swore that there existed a contract that was
not presented to the trial court, Frank Nichols9 affidavit specifically contradicted the stance
of the City. The pleadings in this case showed a substantial amount of dispute over material
facts. Id. Therefore, the trial court did not properly grant the Motion to Dismiss as one for
summary judgment. Furthermore, it is not clear as a matter of law that Smith is not entitled
to some recovery. Amjacs at 53.
Smith asserts that summary judgment in this case was a drastic and inappropriate
remedy. Given a trial, Smith would have been able to produce evidence that "would
reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor." Burningham at 621. The trial court had not
received all of the evidence that it should have considered for summary judgment. Thus,
since the evidence was not known to the trial court through no fault of Smith's, the trial court
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could not "apply the law and thus terminate the matter." " Id. at 621 622. Smith w as not
allowed' In produce evident

'rder

drastic and harmfiil to Smith. Houslev at 392-393. Smith was deprived of the opportunity to
fully present his contentions upon further proceedings. Welchman at 411 -412. Therefore, the
City's contention contained in its Brie] < >/ '/f; ipel lee that su iiiii larj judgmc i : t w as pi operand
that Smith was advised that the trial court was treating the City's Motion to Dismiss as such
should be rejected.
II

SMITH DID NOT INVITE ERROR BY INVITING THE TRIAL COURT TO
CONSIDER CITY'S MOTION TO DISMISS AS A MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has recently discussed (In iii\ iln/il TI-OI don linn; II sink's us

iiiillliin,» in iM'ilrnnil (Mil
"Our invited error doctrine arises from the principle that a party cannot take
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into
committing the error." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 49 1115, 128 P.3d 1171
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). By precluding appellate
review, "the doctrine furthers this principle by 'discouraging parties from
intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for
reversal on appeal.'"/*/, (quotingState v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16,1112, 86
P.3d 742); see State v. King, 2006 I IT 3, 1113, 131 P 3d 202 ("This rule is
designed t<
inhibit a defendant from foregoing ... an objection with the
strategy of enhancing the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that
strategy fails,... claiming on appeal that the court should reverse." (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Further, parties are "not entitled to both the benefit
of not objecting at trial and the benefit of objecting on appeal." King, at If 13
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Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, HI 7, 164 P.3d 366. This case described how a party can
affirmatively invite a court to commit error, stating, "invited error generally occurs in a more
affirmative manner, such as where counsel stipulates to the court's instruction, states directly
that there is no objection to a specific ruling of the court, or provides the court with erroneous
authority upon which the court relies." Id. at 23 see State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023
(Utah 1987) ("[T]he fact remains that counsel consciously chose not to assert any objection
that might have been raised and affirmatively led the trial court to believe that there was
nothing wrong with the instruction.").
The Utah Supreme Court has affirmed the invited error doctrine, stating as follows:
The invited error doctrine prevents a party from taking "'advantage of an error
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the
error.'" State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, If 15, 128 P.3d 1171 {quoting State v.
Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, If 9, 86 P.3d 742). "Affirmative representations that
a party has no objection to the proceedings fall within the scope of the invited
error doctrine because such representations reassure the trial court and
encourage it to proceed without further consideration of the issues." Id. If 16.
Tschaggenv v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37, If 12, 163 P.3d 615. This Court has also
examined the invited error doctrine, stating, "[t]he doctrine of invited error prohibits a party
from setting up an error at trial and then complaining of it on appeal." State v. Redding, 2007
UT App. 350, 1J24, 172 P.3d 319 citing State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201,1205 (Utah
Ct.App.1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, "[o]n appeal, a party cannot
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take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into
committing the error." Id., see State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993).
In the instant case, the record shows that Smith was not advised or put on notice that
the trial court was considering the City's Motion to Dismiss as one for summary judgment.
The record does not indicate at all that Smith stipulated to the trial court treating the motion
as such. Furthermore, the City's contention in its Brief of Appellee lacks merit and should not
be considered by this Court as a valid basis to reject review of Smith's claims of error made
by the trial court.
Smith did not lead the trial court into committing error when it granted the City's
Motion to Dismiss as one for summary judgment. Pratt at ^17. The City was the party who
filed for dismissal and Smith simply responded to their dismissal. However, Smith was not
advised that the trial court was viewing the City's Motion to Dismiss as one for summary
judgment as evidenced by the record. Smith was attempting to survive the grounds of
dismissal based upon UT. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) not UT. R. CIV. P. 56. Smith had no agenda to
preserve a "hidden ground for reversal on appeal." Pratt at^|17. While Smith is aware of the
invited error doctrine, it does not apply to this case because he was unaware that the trial
court was considering the motion for dismissal as one for summary judgment, because he did
not affirmatively act through stipulation to the trial court viewing its motion to dismiss as one
for summary judgment. Id. Smith did not provide the trial court with erroneous authority
upon which the trial court relied in issuing its Dismissal Order. Id. Smith did not reassure the
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trial court and encourage it to proceed with its decision to dismiss the action as one for
summary judgment. Tschaggeny at U12. Smith did not set up the trial court to commit an
error only to now complain about it on appeal, because the facts do not exist or warrant such
behavior. Redding at ^24. As this Court is surely to ascertain upon review of the record for
this case, the City is mistaken in its contention that Smith invited the trial court to commit
error. Thus, its contention should be rejected.
III. THE SHOWING REQUIRED TO SURVIVE A MOTION TO DISMISS
DIFFERS FROM THAT OF A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

state in relevant part concerning motions to

dismiss as follows:
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56,
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
UT. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). The Utah Supreme Court has previously analyzed motions to dismiss
that can be converted into motions for summary judgment. The Court said in pertinent part:
We hold that it is necessary that the record clearly and affirmatively
demonstrate that when a motion to dismiss is made and " . . . matters outside
the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court. . ." UTAH R.
CIV. P. 12(b)... that all parties (including, of course, the non-movant which
was the plaintiff in this case) are given reasonable opportunity to present
additional pertinent material if they wish. See, Advisory Committee Note in
Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 2A, Par. 12.01(9), p. 2215 (It will also be
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observed that if a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is thus converted into a summary
judgment motion, the amendment insures that both parties shall be given a
reasonable opportunity to submit affidavits and extraneous proofs to avoid
taking a party by surprise through the conversion of the motion into a motion
for summary judgment.)
Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n, 587 P.2d 151,152 (Utah
1978). The Utah Supreme Court has also stated that summary judgment is "never used to
determine what the facts are, but only to ascertain whether there are any material issues of
fact in dispute. If there be any such disputed issues of fact, they cannot be resolved by
summary judgment even when the parties properly bring the motion before the court." Hill v.
Grand Central, Inc.. 25 Utah 2d 121,123, 477 P.2d 150 (Utah 1970).
This Court has previously analyzed motions to dismiss, stating in pertinent part as
follows:
Moreover, "[w]hen determining whether a trial court properly dismissed an
action under rule 12(b)(6), we assume that the factual allegations in the
complaint are true and we draw all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff." Cazares v. Cosby, 2003 UT 3,1113, 65 P.3d 1184
(quotations and citations omitted). "A rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is merely a
recognition by a trial court that a plaintiffs claim for relief is formally
deficient," id. at HI4; therefore, "[a] motion to dismiss is appropriate only
where it clearly appears that the plaintiff or plaintiffs would not be entitled to
relief under the facts alleged or under any state of facts they could prove to
support their claim/' Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764,766 (Utah 1991). See also
Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996)
("[T]he purpose of a rule 12(b)(6) motion is to challenge the formal
sufficiency of the claim for relief, not to establish the facts or resolve the
merits of a case.").
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Sony Electronics, Inc. v. Reber, 2004 UT App. 420, H10, 103 P.3d 186. This Court in Sony
determined that, under the circumstances, the trial court improperly dismissed the action as a
12 (b)(6) motion because it relied on documents outside of the complaint and the documents
attached thereto and therefore should have treated the motion as one for summary judgment.
M a t 111111-12.
Furthermore, in Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., the Utah Supreme Court held that
Thayne failed to support his motion against summary judgment because he did not provide
outside evidence to support his pleadings. Ibid, 874 P.2d 120, 124-125 (Utah,1994). The
court in Thayne stated as follows in pertinent part:
[Thayne] did not file any affidavits in support of his complaint, nor did he
attempt to present any other evidence. In the face of Beneficial's properly
supported motion, however, Thayne may not rest on his unverified complaint.
We have indicated that general allegations in an unverified complaint are an
insufficient basis for opposing a properly supported motion for summary
judgment. D&L Supply, 775 P.2d at 421; Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224,
226-27 (Utah 1983). Thayne simply did not meet his burden of presenting
some evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, raising a credible issue of material
fact. Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 624, 637 (1960).
Id.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated, "[a] dismissal is a severe measure and should be
granted by the trial court only if it is clear that a party is not entitled to relief under any state
of facts which could be proved in support of its claim." Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795
P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990) citins Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121 Utah 457,460,243
P.2d 441, 443 (1952). The court in Colman went on to state, "[t]he courts are a forum for
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settling controversies, and if there is any doubt about whether a claim should be dismissed
for the lack of a factual basis, the issue should be resolved in favor of giving the party an
opportunity to present its proof.'9 Id. citing Baur v. Pacific Fin. Corp., 14 Utah 2d 283,284,
383 P.2d 397, 397 (1963). The Court in Colman further analyzed UT. R. CIV. P. 12(b) as it
applied to the case. Id. at 125. The court stated as follows:
The rule states, "[A]ll parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present
all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." UTAH R.CIV.P.
12(b). This rule gives the opposing party an opportunity to gather evidence to
rebut the movant's evidence. Without such a rule, one party could have the
benefit of significant, supporting evidence while the other party would be left
to rely solely on the unsubstantiated pleadings.
This rule has much "practical bearing on the proper outcome" of this case. The
State and Southern Pacific moved for dismissal based on Colman's failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Colman responded to these
motions with a memorandum opposing the motions to dismiss, which focused
exclusively on points of law. Colman appears to have assumed at that point
that the rule 12 standard would be followed. His memorandum began by
stating, "For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the truth of the Complaint's fact
allegations must be assumed." Colman was not given reasonable opportunity to
present additional evidence pursuant to rule 12(b). Had Colman known that the
State would rely on the preliminary injunction evidence, he could have
submitted other evidence to the trial court rebutting that evidence.
Furthermore, the trial court treated the motion to dismiss only under rule 12
and not under rule 56. The trial court did not make any factual findings in
denying Colman's motion for a preliminary injunction. The trial court
specifically stated that it only ruled that plaintiff had not met his burden of
proof for a preliminary injunction and that its ruling was not dispositive of any
other issues. The trial court also refused to order Colman to order the transcript
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of the preliminary injunction proceedings for this appeal. In granting the
State's motion to dismiss, the trial court only entered conclusions of law.
Id. The Utah Supreme Court has also iterated, "[e]ven where a motion is erroneously
characterized as a motion to dismiss, if matters outside the pleadings are presented and not
excluded, the motion is properly treated as one for summary judgment." Lind v. Lynch, 665
P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1983).
In the instant case, as argued and cited to supra, Smith was unaware of the trial court's
intention to treat the City's Motion to Dismiss as one for summary judgment. While it is
Smith's contention that the trial court did not properly convert the City's Motion to Dismiss
as one for summary judgment, the trial court also did not provide Smith with a "reasonable
opportunity to present all materials made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." UTAH R.
CIV. P. 12(b)(6). The record in this case does not "clearly and affirmatively demonstrate"
that Smith was given reasonable opportunity to present additional pertinent material for the
trial court's determination of the merits. Bekins at 152. Furthermore, since the trial court did
not properly convert the dismissal motion into one for summary judgment, Smith was not
allowed to present further evidence outside the pleadings before the trial court issued its
decision granting dismissal. Id.
As argued herein, Smith was preparing against a motion to dismiss which requires a
showing that the claim is sufficient. Furthermore, there were several factual disputes
between the parties. The affidavits submitted by the parties contradicted each other in
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content. See, Affidavits of Kit Wareham and Frank Nichols. Therefore, the trial court granting
summary judgment in this matter was improper because there was dispute over material facts.
Sony at II10. Additionally, the trial court stated in its Dismissal Order that Smith had failed
to state a claim for which relief could be granted, which is a dismissal under UT. R. CIV. P.
12 (b)(6), but then dismissed the action as a summary judgment. See, Dismissal Order at p.
3. Smith asserts that this is improper because the trial court failed to give notice that it was
treating the dismissal motion as one for summary judgment, the trial court failed to properly
convert the Motion to Dismiss to one for summary judgment, and improperly granted the
summary judgment even in light of the disputed material facts at issue. Since there were
material issues of fact in dispute between the parties, the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment. Hill at 123.
The record clearly indicates that, while Smith did submit an affidavit by Frank
Nichols, it was in response to the City's Motion to Strike. In that motion, the City alleged that
Smith had submitted to the Court an unsupported statement of fact. Motion to Strike at p. 1.
Although the trial court viewed the dismissal motion as one for summary judgment, Frank
Nichols1 affidavit supported Smith's allegations contained in the Complaint. See, Affidavit of
Frank Nichols. Therefore, even if the trial court was correct in its granting of the summary
judgment, it was incorrect in stating that Smith had not provided evidence outside the
pleadings to support the Complaint. Dismissal Order at p. 2. Therefore, the trial court acted
on an insufficient basis to grant a summary judgment. Thayne at 125. Smith properly raised
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an issue of material fact, albeit unaware that the trial court was viewing the Motion to
Dismiss as one for summary judgment. Id.
In preparation for the trial court's decision of the action, Smith prepared his pleadings
to show entitlement to relief under a "state of facts which could be proved in support of its
claim." Colman at 624. The trial court erred in granting the summary judgment because the
disputed facts cast doubt on whether the claim should have been dismissed for the lack of
factual basis. Id. Therefore, the trial court should have erred on the side of caution and
resolved the issue in favor of Smith. Id. UT. R. CIV. P. 56 exists to provide both parties with
the opportunity to present evidence in support of their positions outside the pleadings. Id. at
125. Like Colman, Smith assumed that the Rule 12 standard would be followed by the trial
court. Id. And, like Colman, Smith was not given the opportunity to provide the trial court
with further evidence in support of the claims alleged in the pleadings. Id. Therefore, the trial
court erred by granting the summary judgment. Thus, the City's contention in its Brief of
Appellee that Smith was aware of the trial court's decision to treat the Motion to Dismiss as
one for summary judgment and that the decision was proper is without merit and should be
rejected by this Court.
[Remainder of page left intentionally blank]
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rnNCLUSlON

deems necessary.
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